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Preamble
In his Untersuchungen zum Moks.adharma (Die sām. khyistischen Texte) and
in the chapter on Sām. khya of his Geschichte der indischen Philosophie
Erich Frauwallner has shown chapters MBh 12.187 and MBh 12.239–241 of
the Moks.adharma in the Śāntiparvan of the Mahābhārata to be of crucial
importance for understanding the development of the Sām. khya-system.1 The
great Viennese scholar dealt with yet another chapter (MBhB 12.286), which
however has been omitted in the critical edition, but is preserved in the critical
apparatus to MBh 12.187. Conceived as different versions of one and the same
‘Grundtext’, they must, Frauwallner argued, have been held to be of great
significance at the time and probably led an independent existence before they
were included in the collection of doctrines of the Moks.adharma. Frauwallner
attempted a reconstruction of this ‘Grundtext’ by sorting out words and
passages that were judged by him not to have belonged to this text originally.
He succeeded in giving a clear description of a distinctive philosophy, which
he denominated ‘die epische Urform des Sām. khya’. 2 An important conclusion
of his reconstruction is that the so called ‘evolution theory’ had not yet been
developed; according to Frauwallner the evolution theory was adopted by the
Sām. khya later from circles that taught an evolution out of Brahman.3
Van Buitenen (1956) also stressed the importance of these texts, but con-
trary to Frauwallner’s conclusions, he maintained that an evolution theory can
be traced in them. Out of both texts he reconstructed a small tract, which
∗ The first version of this article was published in Asiatische Studien/ Études Asiatiques
LII.3 (1999), 459–472. [= Proceedings of the ‘Conference Sām. khya and Yoga’, Université
de Lausanne, November 6–8 1998.]
1 Frauwallner 1925b; 1953. Frauwallner uses a different numbering, based on the Bombay
edition of the Mahābhārata: MBhB 12.194 (= MBh 12.187) and MBhB 12.247–249 (=
MBh 12.239–241). MBh 12.239–241 is also transmitted as part of the Brahmapurān. a:
BrP 237.43–238.14.
2 Frauwallner 1953, 288–299.
3 Two texts according to Frauwallner have been a major influence upon the development
of the evolution theory: MBh 12.224 and the first book of the Manusmr.ti (Frauwallner
1925a). Cf. Hacker 1961b and Rüping 1977.
223
Hans Teye Bakker - 9789004412071
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 12:53:08PM
via free access
224 Hans T. Bakker & Peter C. Bisschop
somehow had come to be included in this text-group. He recovered this tract
by isolating and arranging those verses in which the term bhāva has apparently
an other meaning than it has in the rest of the texts.4 He emphasized the
evolution process taught in this tract, which, as he put it, has a ‘horizontal
pattern’ in contrast to a ‘vertical pattern’: ‘Not buddhi into manas, manas into
senses etc., but buddhi into manas, buddhi into senses’.5 Bakker (1982) ac-
cepted van Buitenen’s reconstruction as a ‘working-hypothesis’, but criticized
the interpretations of some passages; moreover he questioned van Buitenen’s
claim to have discovered an authentic text. He drew attention to an agreement
of the reconstructed tract with the teachings of Kaus. ı̄taki Upanis.ad 3.6
Three themes
From all these different interpretations we may infer that the chapters under
discussion contain a diversity of ideas, which are not necessarily consistent with
each other. In this paper we want to look at three themes central to both texts
that are relevant to the question put forward by van Buitenen, viz. whether or
not we encounter an evolution theory in these chapters. It will be shown that
this question is related to a difference between both texts with respect to their
conception of buddhi. The three themes are the following:7
1 A teaching about the five elements and their respective differentiation into
sense-organ, sense-faculty and sense-impression.8
4 Van Buitenen 1956, 153:
When we read through the two versions we are struck by the fact that the term bhāva
occurs in two altogether different situations: first in connection with such ‘sensations,
qualities and conditions’ as sukha/pr̄ıti, duh. kha/śoka, moha, prahars.a etc., atus.t.i etc.,
aviveka etc.; secondly in connection with a process by which the buddhi modifies itself
into manas as its bhāva.
5 Van Buitenen 1957a, 22.
6 Bakker 1982b, 144:
[. . . ] The most striking agreement of the epic with the Upanis.ad appears from the
fact that the act of consciousness itself, when it has actualized the senses, evolves
the objects (epic: artha /Kaus.U.: bhūtamātra) of the latter. Or rather, at the very
moment buddhi (or prajñā) actualizes the senses it evolves (epic: vikurute /Kaus.U.:
abhivisr. jate) the object that is apprehended.
7 In addition to these three, there may be distinguished three more themes (in both texts):
an introductory question concerning the self (adhyātman) which forms the beginning of
both texts (MBh 12.187.1–3; 239.1–2), a teaching about the three bhāvās (‘states of
mind’) sattva, rajas and tamas (MBh 12.187.14, 21–35; 239.16, 20–25; 240.6cd–8, 10–
11) and a soteriology (MBh 12.187.44–47, 51–60; 240.13–15; 241.5–14). Many of these
themes, or parts of them, have parallels in other chapters of the Moks.adharma; so, for
example, part of the teaching about the three bhāvās is found also in MBh 12.212.25–31.
Study of these parallels may throw light on the composition and transmission of the
Moks.adharma, as, mutatis mutandis, the Nārāyan. ı̄ya-Studien by Peter Schreiner and
others (1997) has demonstrated.
8 MBh 12.187.4–10; 239.3–12.
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2 A teaching about the intellect (buddhi) and its relation to the ‘knower of
the field’ (ks.etrajña), the mind (manas) and the senses (indriyān. i).9
3 A teaching about the relationship between the sattva and the ks.etrajña.10
The five elements
The first theme forms a coherent whole, which can be distinguished quite easily
from the rest of the texts. The five elements are regarded as the (material) cause
of all sentient beings. They evolve into three modifications (gun. a): a sense-
organ, a sense-faculty and a sense-impression. So, for instance, the element
ākāśa evolves into the ears, hearing and sound.11 The characteristic feature
of this treatment of the elements is the epistemological point of view, which
entails that the essential qualities of the elements are characterized by their
impression on the senses.12
In addition to the five elements as the material cause, this section speaks of
the bhūtakr. t (‘creator of beings’) as a kind of efficient cause (Appendix: A).13
The bhūtakr. t appears to cause the differentiation of the elements into the triple
modification of sense-organ, sense-faculty and sense-impression (MBh 187.7;
MBh 239.6–7). The conclusion seems justified that in this section of both
texts a consistent doctrine is presented, which considers the elements to be the
material out of which sentient beings (bhūta) are made, a process set in motion
by a bhūtakr. t. This section forms a teaching of its own; this is evident also
from the fact that none of the words playing a key role in the rest of the texts,
such as ks.etrajña, buddhi, manas, bhāva and sattva, are used here.
The intellectual apparatus
The transition to the next theme can be illustrated by MBh 187.10cd–11ab
(Appendix: B). Whereas 10cd enumerates the five elements with the manas
as sixth, the following verse 11ab enumerates the five senses and the manas;
the buddhi and the ks.etrajña being respectively the seventh and the eighth
(11cd).14 These verses indicate a transition in both texts: nothing is said
about the elements any more, the senses are given and the teaching about
9 MBh 12.187.11–20; 239.13–15, 17–19; 240.1–6ab, 9–10ab, 12.
10 MBh 12.187.37–43, 48–50; 240.19–22; 241.1–4.
11 MBh 12.187.8ab: śabdah. śrotram. tathā khāni trayam ākāśayonijam |
12 This epistemological perspective remains in classical Sām. khya, where the five elements
are considered to originate from the so called ‘subtle elements’ (tanmātra). These
tanmātrās, in fact, are the sense-impressions: śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa and gandha.
13 The Appendix contains the text of some passages of the critical edition. It is meant
to facilitate comparison: the left column contains a passage of MBh 12.187, the right
column contains the parallel of MBh 12.239–241 and vice versa. A blank means there
is no parallel for a passage.
14 That we are here concerned with a break is also evident from the parallel passage which
omits 187.11ab, and instead of mahābhūtāni pañcaiva (MBh 187.10c) reads indriyān. i
nare pañca (MBh 239.14a).
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their origin out of the elements seems to be forgotten. Whereas up to this
point we had a description of material nature, after it both texts seem to be
dealing with ideal nature only. Although the following teaching about the
buddhi does not form such a clear section as the foregoing teaching about the
elements, the verses which we consider to belong to this teaching all have one
thing in common: they deal with a psychic or ideal principle distinct from the
(material) elements.
The teaching starts with an enumeration of eight principles: the five senses,
the manas, the buddhi and the ks.etrajña. Their respective functions are
given:
The eye is for seeing, the mind causes reflection, the intellect serves determination,
the knower of the field is called the onlooker.15
While both texts agree on these functions they disagree about the relationship
between the buddhi and the ks.etrajña. This disagreement can be deduced from
a small, but important variation in the parallel passages 187.20 and 240.6
(Appendix: C). According to both passages the ‘invisible one’ governs the
senses, but whereas 187.20 uses the masculine adr. śyah. , 240.6 uses the feminine
adr. śyā.16 Therefore in 187.20 the term ‘invisible one’ refers to the ks.etrajña,
whereas in 240.6 it refers to the buddhi. In the parallel passages 187.13 and
239.18 (Appendix: D) there is a similar variation. Both verses deal with the
question: who is the one that sees everything that is above the soles of the feet
and inhabits all this? 187.13 seems to teach that it is the ks.etrajña, as in the
preceding verse the ks.etrajña is called the onlooker. 239.18 however explicitly
states it is the buddhir uttamā (‘supreme intellect’). These variations indicate a
difference with respect to the relationship between the buddhi and the ks.etrajña.
Whereas according to 187 the buddhi and the ks.etrajña are utterly distinct, in
that the one is the active knowledge-principle responsible for the activity of
the senses and the other an absolute, non-active onlooker or subject, in some
parts of 239–241 the buddhi and the ks.etrajña seem to be two sides of one and
the same principle.
The difference between the two texts can be illustrated by comparing those
verses that explain the relation of the buddhi to the senses (appendix: E). In
187.18–19 the senses are characterized as instruments which the buddhi employs
for apperception:
The eye is what it sees with, what it hears with is called the ear, the nose they say
is what it smells with, with the tongue it experiences flavour and with the skin it
feels touches.
In the parallel passage of 240.4–5, however, it is not the instrumental case (yena
paśyati) that is used, but the active present participle together with the finite
verb bhavati:
15 MBh 12.239.15: caks.ur ālocanāyaiva sam. śayam. kurute manah. | buddhir adhyavasānāya
sāks. ı̄ ks.etrajña ucyate ‖
16 Some manuscripts of 240.6 also read adr. śyah. . No manuscript of 187.20 reads adr. śyā.
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While hearing it becomes hearing, while touching it is called touch, while seeing it
becomes sight, while tasting it becomes taste, while smelling it becomes smell.
The buddhi does not employ the senses as instruments, but it is or becomes
itself the senses. The word indriyān. i used in both text passages (187.20; 240.6)
does not seem to have exactly the same meaning: in 240 it denotes the sense-
faculties, whereas in 187 its connotation seems to encompass the sense-organs
as well.17 In 240 a sense is not so much an instrument, as a modification of
the buddhi, viz. a state of mind characterized by sense-perception. In this way
it is said that the buddhi evolves the complex of the senses, just as a tortoise
sticks out its limbs (239.17).
However, despite this occasional ambiguity, the verses in this section do
not deal with material nature, but with ideal nature. The buddhi is therefore
not looked upon as a material entity as it is in classical Sām. khya. In this
connection some remarks have to be made on Frauwallner’s observation—in
the introduction to his translation of the reconstructed ‘Grundtext’, published
in his Nachgelassene Werke II—to the effect that the buddhi in this text-group
is ranked among material nature.
Besondere Bedeutung kommt in ihm [viz. the ‘Grundtext’] der Psychologie zu.
Weltseele und Materie sind nämlich nach ihm scharf getrennt. Dabei werden nicht
nur die Sinnesorgane, sondern auch die psychischen Organe, Denken (manah. ) und
Erkennen (buddhih. ) der Materie zugerechnet.18
In our opinion this is certainly not true for some passages in adhyāya 240.
This becomes evident when we consider MBh 240.3 (Appendix: F). After the
progressive enumeration of the indriyān. i, the arthās, the manas, the buddhi
and the ātman, which we also encounter with some variations in the Kat.ha
Upanis.ad,19 it is said that:
The intellect is the self of man; the intellect indeed is the essence of the self; when
it produces a bhāva it is / becomes mind.20
17 In classical Sām. khya the indriyān. i as faculties are explicitly distinguished from the
organs, which are called their ‘seats’ (adhis.t.hānāni)—e.g. in the Yuktid̄ıpikā (YD ad SK
26cd, p. 197):
ucyate: adhis.t.hānād indriyapr. thaktvam. śaktivíses.opalambhāt | yathā śar̄ırāsambha-
vino vis.ayavyavasāyalaks.an. asya śaktivíses.asyopalambhād arthāntaram. buddhir anu-
mı̄yata evam adhis.t.hānāsambhavino vis.ayagrahan. alaks.an. asya śaktivíses.asyopala-
mbhād arthāntaram indriyam iti |
The use of the term in these texts of the Moks.adharma, however, is ambiguous. Thus
in MBh 12.239.11cd the ‘complex of the senses’ (indriyagrāma) is described as ‘derived
from the five elements’ (pañcabhautika), thereby implying its material nature, whereas
MBh 187.20 seems to conflate the adhis.t.hānāni and the indriyān. i.
18 Frauwallner 1992, 78.
19 Kat.ha Upanis.ad III.10–11; VI.7–8a.
20 MBh 12.240.3: buddhir ātmā manus.yasya buddhir evātmano ’tmikā | yadā vikurute
bhāvam. tadā bhavati sā manah. ‖
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The buddhi is regarded as the essence of the self in this verse. In the preceding
verse however the self is stated to be higher than the buddhi. Consequently
the buddhi seems to exist in two ways: 1) as an absolute, non-intentional self,
corresponding to the ks.etrajña; 2) as an empirical, intentional activity, when
it evolves through the manas into the senses. In the latter case the buddhi
exists as a bhāva, i.e. in a ‘state of modification’. It is obvious that this doc-
trine differs materially from the one found in MBh 187, where the buddhi is
treated as an hypostasis of empirical intellect, fundamentally distinct from the
transcendental subject, ks.etrajña, as well as separated from the senses.21
Sattva and ks.etrajña
The difference between the two texts can be illustrated further by comparing
the passages that deal with the relationship between sattva and ks.etrajña (Ap-
pendix: G). If we understand sattva here, not as referring to a material principle
comparable to the prakr. ti, but as referring to the buddhi,22 a remarkable agree-
ment with the foregoing appears. According to both texts the sattva creates
(sr. jate) the gun. ās, whereas the ks.etrajña is only their observer. The gun. ās are
to be interpreted here as the modifications of the buddhi, just as in the teaching
about the elements the word gun. a denotes the modification of the elements.
The difference between the two texts lies in the relationship of ks.etrajña and
sattva to the self (ātman). For, whereas 187.40cd states that the self is the one
who observes the gun. ās (i.e. is the ks.etrajña) but wrongly thinks himself to
be their creator, according to the parallel passage 240.19ab the self in reality
(yathātatham) is both, the observer (paridras.t.r.) and the creator (sras.t.r.) of the
21 This difference may also explain the parallel verses 187.23 and 240.8. According to 187.23
the essence of the buddhi consists of the three bhāvās (viz. sattva, rajas and tamas) and
it never transcends them; according to 240.8 however it does transcend the three bhāvās,
although its essence is said to consist in them (bhāvātmikā). In both chapters the passage
at issue has variant readings—some manuscripts of 187.23 read ativartate instead of
nātivartate, while some manuscripts of 240.8 read nātivartate instead of ativartate—yet
this variance may be significant and point to an original difference of doctrine rather
than being due to mere textual corruption. In 187.23 the buddhi does not transcend
the three bhāvās, because only the ‘invisible one’, viz. the ks.etrajña, transcends them.
In 240.8 the buddhi does transcend them, since it is equated to the absolute self and as
such is the transcendental ‘invisible one’.
22 Frauwallner (1992) translates sattva in this part of the texts with ‘die Güte’; Edgerton
(1965) translates it with ‘essential (material) reality’. Van Buitenen (1957b, 95) distin-
guishes five meanings of the word sattva in the context of proto-Sām. khya: ‘1. sattva as
the material counterpart of the ks.etrajña; 2. as the buddhi; 3. as a bhāva of the buddhi;
4. as a state of well-being amounting to release; 5. as the first of the three gun. ās’.
Although van Buitenen takes sattva here in the first meaning, he observes that there
is no real difference between the first and the second meaning: ‘In these early forms of
Sām. khya creation does not necessarily start from a higher principle than the buddhi,
e.g., avyakta, pradhāna or prakr. ti, but from the buddhi itself; nor has the aham. kāra
yet taken over the evolutionary functions of the buddhi. As the buddhisattva is indeed
creation and thus the ‘material’ counterpart of the unaffected ks.etrajña’ (1957b, 96–97).
Cf. also Johnston 1937, 50–51.
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gun. ās. The doctrine underlying MBh 240 therefore seems to be that ks.etrajña
and sattva are two aspects of one and the same principle, viz. the buddhi, which
is defined as the Self of man (MBh 240.3ab). If our analysis of these chapters
is correct, it may explain a statement in the Anuḡıtā.
Some wise men who are well established in knowledge declare the identity of the
ks.etrajña and the sattva, this is not correct.23
This verse may be taken to refer to those passages of 239–241 that teach the
unity of the ks.etrajña and the sattva within the self. This unity appears as
two aspects (dialectical moments) of the buddhi: on the one hand as the tran-
scendental subject, styled ‘ks.etrajña’, on the other hand as the phenomenality
(intentionality) of consciousness, styled ‘sattva’ (‘being’), that is intellect (bu-
ddhi) as activity, which comprises manas, the senses and their objects.
The ‘evolution theory’
We now return to the ‘evolution theory’ that van Buitenen found in his recon-
structed tract. The verses van Buitenen used for his tract are those that deal
with the modification of the buddhi. However, he mixes passages from 187 and
239–241, thereby blurring the difference between them. Frauwallner also con-
flates the texts, selecting material from all three dialogues and blending them
into one ‘Grundtext’. The unacceptable consequences of this conflation can be
seen when we look at the important difference between the buddhi using the
sense-organs in 187 and the buddhi becoming the sense-faculties in 240, which
difference is obliterated in the verses 18–19 of his ‘Grundtext’.
Wodurch es sieht, das ist das Auge. Hörend wird es Gehör genannt. Riechend
wird es zum Geruch. Schmeckend ist es der Geschmack. Mit der Haut berührt es
die Berührung. Vielfach wandelt sich das Erkennen. Wenn es etwas begehrt, dann
wird es zum Denken.24
However, Frauwallner was right in his observation that the evolution theory of
the Sām. khya is not attested in this text-group. Frauwallner has given three
features of the evolution theory:
Die Vorstellung der Urmaterie (prakr. ti), die Lehre von den drei Eigenschaften
(gun. ās) der Urmaterie und die Lehre von den 25 Wesenheiten.25
23 MBh 14.48.9: āhur eke ca vidvām. so ye jñāne supratis.t.hitāh. | ks.etrajñasattvayor aikyam
ity etan nopapadyate ‖
24 Frauwallner 1992, 82–83. Frauwallner’s eclectic translation finds some support in MBhB
12.286.19–20, since this text also seems to be a mixture of both theories (cf. Frauwallner
1992, 82, n. 34–36):
yena paśyati tac caks.uh. śr.n. vat̄ı śrotram ucyate |
jighrat̄ı bhavati ghrān. am. rasat̄ı rasanā rasān ‖ 19 ‖
sparśanam. sparśat̄ı sparśān buddhir vikriyate ’sakr. t |
yadā prārthayate kim. cit tadā bhavati sā manah. ‖ 20 ‖
25 Frauwallner 1953, 300.
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We find none of them in these texts. What van Buitenen has styled a ‘horizontal
evolution theory’ is different from what Frauwallner called an ‘evolution theory’.
We would prefer to call the former a ‘teaching about the modification of the
buddhi’. This teaching does not have a cosmological but a psychological status:
it explains how the buddhi evolves the manas as its bhāva and subsequently dif-
ferentiates into the sense-faculties. The ontological implications of this teaching
conflict with the teaching about the elements in the first part of both texts,
where it is said that not only the sense-organs and the sense-impressions, but
also the sense-faculties have their origin in the elements. These texts therefore
do not contain a consistent philosophy, but display the same diversity as so
much of the Moks.adharma.
The Moks.adharma: a plurality of views
The above analysis raises a number of questions, which—though, admittedly,
they cannot all be answered—need to be addressed, if any progress into the
early history of the Sām. khya philosophical tradition is to be made. These
questions are closely connected with the source material from which we have
to reconstruct that history; in this particular case: how do we conceive of the
coming into being of the Mahābhārata text corpus, especially its largest book,
the Śāntiparvan. Frauwallner’s hypothesis of one ‘Grundtext’ that had been
transmitted independently for a long time, had consequently developed into
three different recensions, before the latter were included in the text of the
Moks.adharma by one or more redactors, only to be further mutilated in the
course of transmission, that hypothesis proves untenable. As we have shown
there are clearly different views underlying the dialogues of Yudhis.t.hira and
Bh̄ıs.ma (adhyāya 187) on the one hand, and that of Śuka and Vyāsa (adhyāyas
239–241) on the other. An irreconcilable discrepancy had also been van Bui-
tenen’s starting point, but to explain it this scholar applied basically the same
method as Frauwallner, though in more textual detail, when he constructed a
new, smaller text out of both dialogues: ‘simply a text legitimately restored on
the basis of two incomplete and corrupt versions’.26
However, instead of postulating or ‘restoring’ a ‘Grundtext’, we may make
another assumption, namely that the redactor(s) of the Moks.adharma was
acquainted with various guru-traditions (see below, p. 511), which he aimed to
represent in different dialogues. These philosophical lineages may have been
closely related, enough to employ the same jargon, including technical terms,
expressions, metaphors and even verses; but within them different techniques to
obtain inner tranquillity (yoga) may have developed, and accordingly different
views to account for these experiences.
26 Van Buitenen 1956, 156.
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A scenario opposite to the one proposed by Frauwallner may be envisaged:
in the course of composition, redaction, transmission, further revision, and fix-
ation of the Moks.adharma a tendency may have been at work to straighten
out contradicting views. If this were the case, the starting point may not have
been one ‘Grundtext’ that degenerated into various distorted representations,
but rather a plurality of theories and views that found textual expression and
was amalgamated in a parvan or sub-parvan, which became gradually more
homogeneous in a process of composition-in-transmission (cf. above, p. 177).
This process may have been concomitant with the rise of the classical school
of Sām. khya. In other words, rather than for an underlying unity we should
search for diversity behind the apparent homogeneity. Paradoxically, greater
philosophical homogeneity may have been accomplished at the cost of more tex-
tual inconsistencies. This genetic model would imply that, though the Moks.a-
dharma as we have it offers already a bewildering diversity of often contradict-
ing views, the historical reality at the time of its first composition was still
more complex—each ashram, so to speak, having its own competing version of
proto-Sām. khya philosophy and being keen on having it canonized in the Smr.ti.
An original plurality may not only account for the essential differences be-
tween both dialogues, but also for unsolved philosophical problems within each.
How does the theory of the five mahābhūtas and their differentiation within sen-
sitive beings concord with the psychological or ideal world treated in the rest of
both dialogues? We are here apparently concerned with a cosmological theory
in which God, the bhūtakr. t mentioned in 187.7 and 239.6, plays a key role.27
This same theory is found in other chapters of the Moks.adharma, which by
Frauwallner are not styled ‘epische Urform des Sām. khya’.
This brings us to our final point. What justification, if any, is there to annex
the two dialogues at issue to the Sām. khya tradition and not, for instance, the
dialogue between Manu and Br.haspati? If the hallmark of Sām. khya is a rift
between the material and ideal world, all three dialogues may be said to belong
to the same multifarious stream from which classical Sām. khya emerged.
27 Cf. MBh 12.121.55, 12.175.16.
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Appendix
Some parallels of Moks.adharma 187 and 239–241
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